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Commentary: Exploiting Mixed Speech
Caroline Mala Corbin*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has been taking advantage of mixed
speech—that is, speech that is both private and governmental—to
characterize challenged speech in a way that ultimately permits the
government to sponsor Christian speech. In Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, a free speech case where the government accepted a
Christian Ten Commandments monument but rejected a Summum
Seven Aphorisms monument, the Court held that privately donated
monuments displayed in public parks were government speech as
opposed to private speech and therefore not subject to free speech
limits on viewpoint discrimination. In Town of Greece v. Galloway,
an establishment case where the local government invited
overwhelmingly Christian clergy to give a prayer before town
meetings, the Court found no Establishment Clause violation in part
by attributing constitutionally troubling aspects of the speech to the
private speakers rather than to the government.
INTRODUCTION
Currently, speech tends to be classified as either private speech or
government speech, and this classification can be dispositive. If a private
person is speaking, say with a bumper sticker, then the Free Speech Clause
protections—such as those against viewpoint discrimination—apply but
Establishment Clause limits on religious speech do not. If the government is
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., Harvard University; J.D.,
Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Sergio Campos, Michael Cheah, Mary Anne Franks,
Helen Louise Norton, Alexander Tsesis, and Sonja West for helpful comments and to Sabrina
Niewialkouski for helpful research.	
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speaking, as with a government press release, the reverse is true: free speech
restrictions on viewpoint discrimination do not apply but Establishment Clause
restrictions on religious speech do.
Despite this doctrinal dichotomy, a great deal of speech is actually neither
purely private, nor purely governmental, but a combination of the two.1 No
single factor necessarily determines who the speaker is. Instead, when deciding
who is speaking, one might consider: who is the literal speaker, who
controls the message, who pays for the speech, what is the goal of the
program in which the speech occurs, and ultimately, to whom would a
reasonable person attribute the speech. 2 When the factors point to both
private and government speakers, the result is mixed speech—speech that
cannot be cleanly designated into one category or the other.
Examples of mixed speech abound. Specialty license plates, the subject of
a free speech case the Supreme Court will decide this term, are a classic
example.3 On the one hand, the government authorizes, manufactures, and
owns the specialty license plates. On the other hand, private individuals select
them, pay extra for them, and put them on their cars.
Recent religious speech cases, particularly Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum4 and last term’s Town of Greece v. Galloway,5 also arguably involved
mixed speech. Pleasant Grove involved privately donated monuments
displayed in a public park. Members of the minority Summum religion
complained that the government violated the Free Speech Clause by favoring
Christianity because the city had chosen to display a Ten Commandments
monument but refused to display the group’s religious monument. In Greece, a
municipal government invited private clergy from local congregations to give
prayers at official town meetings. Religious minorities complained that the
prayer program violated the Establishment Clause by favoring Christianity over
other religions because almost all of the government-sponsored prayers were
explicitly Christian. In both cases, the Court took advantage of the mixed
nature of the speech at issue to characterize it in a way that permitted state
sponsorship of Christianity.

1. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605 (2008).
2. Id. at 626–40.
3. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.
2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3101 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2014) (No. 14-144).
4. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
5. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).

2015]

COMMENTARY: EXPLOITING MIXED SPEECH

39

I.
PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM: GOVERNMENT-SELECTED TEN
COMMANDMENTS MONUMENT AS GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Pleasant Grove was a free speech case. The city had placed eleven
monuments donated by private individuals in its Pioneer Park. Among them
was a Ten Commandments monument given by the Fraternal Order of Eagles
(Eagles). The Summum, a small religious group, attempted to donate a
religious monument listing its own tenets, the Seven Aphorisms. The city
rejected it, explaining that it only took monuments that “directly relate” to the
town’s history or were donated by groups “with longstanding ties” to the
community.6 Public parks, where citizens have historically gathered to speak
on public issues, are considered “traditional public forums.”7 Any contentbased discrimination by the state in traditional public forums is subject to strict
scrutiny, lest the state “use content-based restrictions to advance a particular
ideology.”8 The Summum argued that by accepting a Christian religious
monument while rejecting their Summum religious monument, the government
discriminated not just based on content, but on viewpoint as well. After finding
a free speech violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered the city to erect the group’s
monument.9
According to the Supreme Court, the pivotal question was whether the
government was “engaging in [its] own expressive conduct” or “providing a
forum for private speech.”10 In other words, was the government itself speaking
or was it merely providing an opportunity for private citizens to speak? The
best answer may well be both. While it is difficult to pinpoint the “literal
speaker” of a monument, the Eagles essentially signed the monument by
carving their name on it.11 As for who controlled the message, the Eagles
designed the monument without any input from the government,12 while the
government decided whether to display it or not. Although there was no

6. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 465.
7. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (noting that streets and
parks “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions”).
8. Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 555
U.S. 460 (2009).
9. Id. at 1057. The Court held that Pioneer Park was a traditional public forum and that
the city’s content-based refusal failed strict scrutiny.
10. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467.
11. “Presented to the City of Pleasant Grove and Utah County, Utah by Utah State Aerie
Fraternal Order of Eagles” is carved on a scroll at the base of the monument.
12. The Pleasant Grove City Ten Commandments monolith was one of over a hundred
that the Fraternal Order of Eagles designed, produced, and gave to local municipalities. See, e.g.,
Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 2002) (“During the 1950s and 1960s, the
Eagles donated similar [Ten Commandments] monuments to communities across the United
States.”).
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question that the Eagles paid for the Ten Commandments,13 there was
disagreement about whether monuments differed from other speech in public
parks, which had always been treated as a traditional public forum. If forced to
choose between private and government speech, reasonable people might easily
come to difficult conclusions, as the lower courts and the Supreme Court did.
In the end, the Supreme Court held that monuments in public parks amounted
to government speech: “Permanent monuments displayed on public property
typically represent government speech.”14
Because they were deemed government speech, the monuments were not
subject to free speech limits on content and viewpoint discrimination. “The
Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does
not regulate government speech.”15 That is, under the Free Speech Clause, the
government is free to prefer one viewpoint over another in its own speech. As
for the obvious Establishment Clause problem created by a government
endorsing the Ten Commandments but not the Seven Aphorisms, the question
was not before the Court and the majority never addressed it. The Court,
perhaps, meant to finesse the issue with its exegesis about the difficulty of
pinpointing the meaning of symbols that may carry multiple meanings and
whose meaning may change over time.16 While this is true, a Ten
Commandments engraved with “I AM the LORD thy God; Thou shalt have no
other gods before me; Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven images; Thou
shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; Remember the Sabbath
day, to keep it holy”17 does not necessarily possess these ambiguities.
II.
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY: GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PRAYERS AS
PRIVATE SPEECH
The Establishment Clause question was front and center in Town of
Greece v. Galloway. The town invited local clergy––“chaplain[s] for the
month”18––to give a prayer at the beginning of town meetings. At first, the
town chose these unpaid chaplains by calling congregations in the town
directory and asking for volunteers.19 Later, the town solicited chaplains from a
list of people who had agreed to come.20 Because all the congregations listed in

13. Id.
14. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 470.
15. Id. at 467.
16. Id. at 474–77.
17. Summum, 297 F.3d at 997 (describing parallel Eagles Ten Commandments
monument).
18. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the directory were Christian,21 all the invited chaplains were Christian, as were
their prayers.22 Despite the overwhelmingly Christian prayers at the very seat
of government at the very moment of self-governance,23 the Supreme Court
concluded that the town’s prayer program did not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Greece’s government-sponsored prayers are a paradigmatic example of
mixed speech. The message is the result of private and government control—
the government created the prayer program and invited clergy to give prayers,
while the clergy determined the content of the prayers. Although the literal
speakers were private individuals, the purpose of the legislative prayers was not
to create a forum for individual debate on prayer, but rather to use prayer for
governmental ends: specifically to “lend gravity”24 to the town meetings and
“to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers.”25 As with the park
monuments, reasonable people could attribute the prayers to the government
that sponsored them, to the private individuals who gave them, or to both.
The Court’s exploitation of mixed speech was more subtle in Greece than
in Summum. Unlike in Summum, where it completely avoided Free Speech
Clause questions by defining the challenged religious speech as purely
governmental, the Supreme Court did not completely avoid Establishment
Clause questions by categorizing the challenged religious speech as purely
private.26 Even the Supreme Court could not deny the strong governmental
component of the speech. After all, the town started the prayer practice, chose
the speakers, held the prayers at town meetings, and described the prayers as
meant for the town’s lawmakers. Instead, the Court evaded the establishment
problems raised by the Christian prayers by strategically emphasizing the
private nature of the speech. This tactic is evident in both its argument that the
predominantly Christian nature of the prayers was unintentional and

21. In fact, there was a Buddhist temple in town, but it was not listed and never contacted.
Id. at 1828 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 1816. Notably, the town never suggested that the chaplains give nonsectarian
prayers. Id.
23. Id. at 1825 (“Citizens attend town meetings . . . [to] speak on matters of local
importance; and petition the board for action that may affect their economic interests, such as the
granting of permits, business licenses, and zoning variances.”).
24. Id. at 1823.
25. Id. at 1826.
26. Recall that if prayers were categorized as purely private speech, they would not trigger
the Establishment Clause at all.
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unavoidable,27 and its argument that the government did not coerce religious
minorities into participating in predominantly Christian prayers.28
Crucial to the Court’s ruling was the fact that the almost exclusively
Christian prayers occurred without any discriminatory intent by government
officials. Had the town purposely excluded non-Christian chaplains, the
outcome might have been different. But here, according to the Court, it just
happened that the local congregations were Christian: “Although most of the
prayer-givers were Christian, this fact reflected only the predominately
Christian identity of the town’s congregations, rather than an official policy or
practice of discriminating against minority faiths.”29 Perhaps in order to stave
off complaints that the Establishment Clause obliges the town to do more to
avoid overwhelmingly Christian prayers such as recommending nonsectarian
prayers,30 the majority suggests, but never actually holds, that requiring the
town’s “chaplain[s] for the month” to keep their prayers nonsectarian might
infringe on their First Amendment rights. For example, the Court states, “to
hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures that
sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide cases to act as
supervisors and censors of religious speech.”31 Note the word censors.
Censorship, of course, means that the government is silencing private speakers
and is anathema in free speech.
The free speech concern about government regulation of private speech
runs throughout the opinion, even though Greece is not a free speech case, and
the speech at issue is not purely private speech. The Court invokes free speech
once more when it suggests––again, it does not hold but merely suggests––that
the state has created a forum for private speech and therefore cannot
discriminate based on content or viewpoint: “Once it invites prayer into the
public sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own
God or gods as conscience dictates.”32
The Court again waves the free speech banner when grappling with
whether citizens attending the town meeting in order to petition the government
might feel compelled to participate in the prayers. In dismissing the notion, the

27. See Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1820–24; see also id. at 1824 (“That nearly all of the
congregations in town turned out to be Christian does not reflect an aversion or bias on the part of
town leaders against minority faiths. So long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination,
the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers
. . . .”).
28. See id. at 1824–27; see also id. at 1825 (“[T]he Court is not persuaded that the town of
Greece, through the act of offering a brief, solemn, and respectful prayer to open its monthly
meetings, compelled its citizens to engage in a religious observance.”).
29. Id. at 1817 (summarizing with approval the district court’s findings).
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822; see id. (“Government may not mandate a civic religion that
stifles any but the most generic reference to the sacred any more than it may prescribe a religious
orthodoxy.”).
32. Id.
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Court writes, “Adults often encounter speech they find disagreeable.”33 This
deliberately echoes the famous Supreme Court passage: “‘If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.’”34 In short, the Court implies that government
attempts at nonsectarian prayers would raise free speech problems, and that
objectors are childish hecklers trying to censor speech they find to be
“offensive or disagreeable” instead of accepting it as an inevitable by-product
of our free speech regime.
These insinuations, made possible by the mixed nature of the challenged
speech, do not withstand closer scrutiny. To start, Greece involved no forum
for private speech: the government selected the speakers, and the prayer
practice was explicitly held to be for the government’s benefit.35 Indeed, how
could the prayers amount to a forum open to private speakers when almost no
one knew about it36 and it is unclear whether all viewpoints would be
welcome.37 In addition, the argument that grown ups must learn to tolerate
disagreeable speech makes more sense when the speakers are private people
expressing their varied viewpoints as opposed to the government speaking for
its own benefit. Granted, the speech is not purely governmental either.38
Nonetheless, the Court’s willingness to think of it as mixed in this case stands
in sharp contrast to its insistence in Pleasant Grove that once the speech falls
into the government speech category, the Free Speech Clause simply does not
apply. In other words, if the prayers represent government speech, then under
the Supreme Court’s own government speech doctrine, the government may
dictate the content of its own speech without worrying about the Free Speech
Clause.
In addition to using the mixed nature of the prayers to raise phantom free
speech issues, the Supreme Court uses it to dissociate the government from the
prayers. Although the Court acknowledges that certain prayers risk violating
the Establishment Clause, it distances the town from the very qualities it
identifies as problematic by attributing them to the private speakers. For
example, in rejecting the coercion claim, the Court writes, “[T]he analysis
would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in
33. Id. at 1826.
34. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991) (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)).
35. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825 (“The principal audience for these invocations is not,
indeed, the public but lawmakers themselves, who may find that a moment of prayer or quiet
reflection sets the mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of governing.”).
36. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the town’s “failure to infor[m] members of
the general public that volunteers would be acceptable prayer givers” (internal citation omitted)).
37. While the town states they would welcome prayers other than Christian ones praising
God and Jesus, they presumably would not welcome prayers that attacked Christian beliefs.
38. I argue elsewhere that regulation of mixed speech should be subject to a rigorous
intermediate scrutiny. See Corbin, supra note 1, at 675–80.
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prayers.”39 When confronted by the fact that on several occasions, the town’s
chaplains of the month asked audience members to rise and join the prayer, the
Court responds that “[t]hese requests, however, came not from the town leaders
but from the guest ministers, who presumably are accustomed to directing their
congregations in this way.”40 In other words, the Court determined these
requests to join in Christian prayer came from private speakers, not from the
government. In short, the Greece Court took advantage of the mixed nature of
speech to dissociate the government from speech that would otherwise violate
the Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
In both of these cases, the Supreme Court exploited the mixed nature of
challenged speech to characterize it in a way that permits state sponsorship of
Christian speech. In Pleasant Grove, the Court evaded the viewpoint
discrimination issue by characterizing the speech as government speech and
then refusing to consider the Establishment Clause issue as not before the
Court. The bottom line was that the city could display a Christian monument
while refusing to display a non-Christian monument. In Greece, the Court
distanced the government from the Christian prayers the government itself
invited by suggesting the speech was private speech, and therefore not
attributable to the government. The Court went so far as to imply that
regulating the religious content to be more inclusive might violate the free
speech rights of the private religious speakers, even though no free speech
claim was before the Court. The bottom line was that the town could continue
opening its meetings with predominantly Christian prayers. In sum, by
selectively emphasizing the governmental or private nature of mixed speech,
the Supreme Court made possible state-sponsored religious speech.

39.
40.

Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826.
Id.

